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Veil Piercing to Non-Owners:
A Practical and Theoretical Inquiry
Mark J. Loewenstein

∗

Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as de1
vices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.

I.

INTRODUCTION
2

Limited liability for corporate shareholders and for members of
3
a limited liability company (LLC) is the default rule in every jurisdic4
tion in the United States. Under this rule, the “veil” of the entity
shields its owners from liability for the debts, obligations, and tortious
conduct of the entity, unless the owner personally guaranteed the ob5
ligations or personally engaged in tortious conduct. Every jurisdic∗
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1
Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
2
See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(a) (2008) (“Unless otherwise provided in
the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable
for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become personally liable
by reason of his own acts or conduct.”).
3
See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 303(a), 6B U.L.A. 587 (1996) (“A member
or manager of [an LLC] is not personally liable for a debt, obligation, or liability of
the company solely by reason of being or acting as a member or manager.”).
4
See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATING, RIBSTEIN & KEATING ON
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 12:1 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
5
Partners in both limited liability partnerships (LLPs) and limited liability limited partnerships, as well as limited partners in limited partnerships (LPs), all enjoy
limited liability but also theoretically face the prospect of liability through veil piercing. There are, however, virtually no cases in which limited liability partners are held
liable on a veil-piercing theory. This is likely due to the fact that a creditor desiring
to reach the assets of, for example, a limited partner in an LP could prevail if the
creditor could establish that the limited partner participated in control of the business. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT, § 303(a) (amended 1985), 6B U.L.A. 180
(2008); see also Zeiger v. Wilf, 755 A.2d 608, 617 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (describing “a number of activities which . . . do not constitute participating in ‘the control of’ a business so as to impose a general partner’s liability on a limited partner”);
Trans-Am Builders, Inc. v. Woods Mill, Ltd., 210 S.E.2d 866, 869 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974)
(explaining that “[i]t would be unreasonable to hold that a limited partner may not
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tion, however, has an important judicially created exception to this
rule; under certain circumstances this veil will be pierced, and the
6
owner will be held personally liable. Precisely what those circumstances are has been the subject of numerous court opinions; indeed,
7
no issue in corporate law has been litigated more frequently, and the
8
number of cases involving piercing in LLCs has grown rapidly. Scholarly commentators—always on the lookout for meaty topics—have
not overlooked this, and thus, there are many articles arguing the
benefits, as well as the detriments, of limited liability and veil pierc9
ing. Nearly all such articles focus on the entity owner as the party at
10
risk when veil piercing occurs. In fact, these articles simply assume
11
that the entity owner is the only party at risk. Little has been written
about the risk to other actors in the entity, yet as two recent Colorado

advise with the general partner and visit the partnership business, particularly when
the project is confronted with a severe financial crisis”). LLPs will provide courts
with a new opportunity to apply veil-piercing doctrines, but to date, there are no reported cases doing so.
While this Article focuses on LLCs and corporations, much of what is written in
this Article may apply to LLPs as well. As Bill Callison so perceptively observes, however, we should be careful before we carry corporate doctrines forward to unincorporated entities. See J. William Callison, Rationalizing Limited Liability and Veil Piercing,
58 BUS. LAW. 1063, 1072 (2003) (“The entity rationalization movement provides the
opportunity for scholars, practitioners, and legislators to take a step back and to consider the various rationale for offering limited liability protection to firm owners and
to determine the extent to which such protection should be given.”).
6
See Peter B. Oh, Veil Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV 81, 116 (2010).
7
Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1991).
8
Restricted to the year 2000, there were six cases found in Westlaw using the
search terms “pierc! the veil” and “LLC.” In contrast, the same search restricted to
the year 2008 produced thirty-five cases. A similar search of LexisNexis turned up
four cases in 2000 and twenty-three cases in 2008.
9
See, e.g., Rebecca J. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing for all Limited Liability Entities:
Forcing the Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 95 (2001);
Douglas C. Michael, To Know a Veil, 26 J. CORP. L. 41 (2000); David Million, Piercing the
Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J.
1305 (2004).
10
See, e.g., Robert Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 505, 541 (1977) (“Cases attempting to pierce the corporate veil are unified
more by the remedy sought—subjecting to corporate liabilities the personal assets
directly held by shareholders—than by repeated and consistent application of the
same criteria for granting the remedy.”); see also STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE
CORPORATE VEIL § 1.1 (Supp. 2010); Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the
New Limited Liability Entities, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1997).
11
See generally sources in notes 9–10.
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12

cases, Sheffield Services Co. v. Trowbridge and McCallum Family L.L.C. v.
13
14
Winger, demonstrate, this risk is real.
This Article focuses on the other actors in the entity and analyzes whether they should be liable under a veil-piercing theory. A considered discussion of this question, however, must begin with the rationale for veil piercing in the owner context. What is the rationale
for piercing an entity’s veil to reach its owners, and does this rationale apply with equal force to other actors? This Article suggests that
the rationale for holding an owner liable for an entity’s obligations is
15
weak at best and weaker still when applied to other actors.
Part II of this Article proceeds with a brief review of the veil16
piercing doctrine as applied to entity owners. Next, it considers
theories under which the LLC manager or corporate officers may be
liable to the entity’s creditors (both in tort and contract) apart from a
veil-piercing theory. This inquiry is important because if alternative
theories impose liability when, as a matter of public policy, liability is
appropriate, veil piercing may be superfluous. In fact, this Article
demonstrates that this may be the case. Finally, Part III of this Article
considers veil-piercing cases involving these other actors and concludes with some observations about veil piercing.
Preliminary to this inquiry, however, one must consider whether
it is sensible to consider corporation and LLC cases together. They
are, after all, quite different entities. The LLC is characterized as a
“contractual entity;” its organizers enter into an operating agreement
12

211 P.3d 714 (Colo. App. 2009).
221 P.3d 69 (Colo. App. 2009).
14
Several other reported cases have dealt with this issue. See, e.g., Wordtech Sys.
v. Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1313 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
Faulkner v. Kornman (In re Heritage Org., L.L.C.), 413 B.R. 438, 516 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2009).
15
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 515
(2001) (“The present state of veil piercing doctrine allows judges to impose their
own brand of rough justice without being overly concerned with precedent or appellate review.”).
16
Commentary on veil piercing often includes a discussion of “enterprise liability,” the theory under which all participants in a single business enterprise ought to
be liable for the conduct of any one of the participants. This theory is typically important in corporate groups, but it may arise in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Daniel W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565,
1614–15 (1991) (advocating abolishing limited liability for wholly owned subsidiaries
under some circumstances); Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct
and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV.
1, 35–40 (1994) (advocating extending liability in the context of the corporate family). See generally PRESSER, supra note 10, § 1:9. Because the focus of this Article is on
the liability of individual managers of limited liability entities, enterprise liability is of
no moment and will not be considered further.
13
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17

containing such provisions as to which they agree. Indeed, a number of state’s LLC statutes specifically provide that courts should
18
honor the “freedom of contract.” The applicable statute typically
consists of default rules with very few non-waivable “mandatory provi19
sions.” In this regard, there are no mandatory “formalities” to which
20
those operating the LLC must adhere.
In contrast to the informality of the LLC and the flexibility of
LLC acts, corporate statutes contain a number of mandatory provisions and required corporate formalities. Although there is some
21
opt-out flexibility, corporations typically are required to have a
22
23
board of directors, hold annual meetings of shareholders, desig24
nate certain specified officers, provide minimum notice for share25
26
holder meetings and special director meetings, and establish ap27
praisal rights for shareholders who dissent from certain transactions.
While corporate law has been trending towards affording greater
flexibility in the way a corporation structures its affairs, a great deal of
28
rigidity exists and is likely to persist for the foreseeable future.

17
See, e.g., Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and LLCs, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221, 221 (2009).
18
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-1304(a) (2011) (“It is the policy of this chapter
to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of operating agreements.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-108(4) (2010) (“It is the
intent of this article to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of operating agreements.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §
18-1101(b) (2011) (“It is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of LLC agreements.”).
19
Common mandatory provisions often relate to members’ access to company
books and records and the duty of loyalty for those managing the company. See, e.g.,
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 103(b), 6B U.L.A. 596 (1996).
20
Kaycee Land & Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 328 (Wyo. 2002).
21
See, e.g., JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 3.10, 57 (2d ed.
2004); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.30(a) (2008) (allowing articles of incorporation to provide shareholders with preemptive rights to purchase unissued shares).
22
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(a) (2008).
23
Id. § 7.01(a).
24
ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.483(a) (2011) (requiring each corporation to have a
president, secretary, and treasurer).
25
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.05(a).
26
Id. § 8.22(a).
27
Id. § 13.02(a).
28
Mark J. Loewenstein, A New Direction for State Corporate Codes, 68 U. COLO. L.
REV. 453, 466 (1997) (noting that many jurisdictions have “produced a hybrid corporate code that pleases neither those who advocate shareholder protection nor those
who prefer complete freedom of contract”).
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As discussed below, the failure to follow corporate formalities of29
ten looms large in corporate veil-piercing cases. This failure suggests, at least to courts, that the shareholder did not treat the corporation as a separate legal entity and paves the way for the court to do
likewise. As LLCs have only self-imposed formalities, if any, the failure to adhere to formalities cannot logically be a factor in deciding
30
whether the veil of an LLC should be pierced. This, however, has
31
not proven to be a barrier in the LLC veil-piercing cases. Instead,
the courts have focused on other facts, indicating that the LLC own32
ers did not treat the LLC as a separate legal entity. This doctrine
may bleed back into corporate veil-piercing cases, but this remains to
be seen. As the law stands currently, except for the continuing importance of the formalities test in corporate cases, the articulated veil33
piercing tests for corporations and LLCs are substantially the same.
Thus, this Article considers veil piercing for incorporated and unincorporated entities together.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF VEIL PIERCING
A. The Traditional Rubric: The “Privilege Theory”
Although courts have considered whether a shareholder may be
34
held liable for a corporation’s debts since at least the 1800s, Professor Maurice Wormser first popularized the phrase “piercing the cor35
porate veil” in the early 1900s. Professor Wormser argued that the
issuance of a corporate charter is a “privilege” granted by the state

29

See discussion infra Part II.
Kaycee Land & Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 328 (Wyo. 2002).
31
See, e.g., Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. R.D. Kushnir & Co., 274 B.R. 768, 775
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002) (“‘[M]embers’ or ‘managers’ of an Illinois [LLC] cannot be
held liable for the mere failure to observe corporate formalities or repayment, but
nothing in the statute bars piercing of the ‘corporate veil’ for other grounds on
which that may be done for ordinary corporations.”); Bonner v. Brunson, 585 S.E.2d
917, 919 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that “[i]n the absence of any evidence that
[defendant] abused the form of the LLC by commingling or confusing LLC business
with his personal affairs, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment dismissing the claim that [defendant] was personally liable for the alleged debt of the
LLC”).
32
See, e.g., Sheffield Servs. Co. v. Trowbridge, 211 P.3d 714 (Colo. App. 2009).
33
See Oh, supra note 6, at 84; see also Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Preserving LLC
Veil Piercing: A Response to Bainbridge, 31 J. CORP. L. 1063 (2006) (examining sixty-one
LLC veil-piercing cases up to and including 2005).
34
See, e.g., Booth v. Bunce, 33 N.Y. 139 (1865).
35
PRESSER, supra note 10, § 1.5 (2009) (citing Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of
Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 496 (1912)).
30
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and that, if abused, that privilege (or at least its grant of limited liabil36
ity for the shareholders) can be revoked.
The privilege theory assumes that a corporation has the responsibility to operate in accordance with the public interest, strictly pur37
suant to the purpose for which the charter was granted. Under this
theory, if the corporation is operated in a way that is “counter to the
spirit” of the privilege granted, its existence can be ignored. Professor Wormser wrote that:
Since the element of personality is an extraordinary privilege conferred upon the corporation by the law, and involves the employment of a fiction, it follows that “it must be used for legitimate business purposes and must not be perverted,” and, just as
night follows day, so the courts should and will disregard this fiction “when it is urged for an intent or purpose not within its rea38
son and policy.”

In support of this view, Professor Wormser discussed People’s
39
Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder. This case involved an attempt by African-American citizens to avoid the racially restrictive covenants on vacant property by forming a corporation to acquire the property and
40
build an amusement park for people of color. The court held that
the covenant was not breached because the corporation was an “artificial person” with “a distinct existence—an existence separate from
41
that of its stockholders.”
Professor Wormser argued that the court erred in the decision
because it “entirely overlook[ed] that the sole purpose of organization of the corporation was obviously to evade and circumvent the
42
title restriction forbidding negroes from taking the land.” Therefore, because the formation of the corporation was an abuse of the
incorporation privilege, the court should have disregarded the fiction. Professor Wormer’s dictum was consistent with United States v.
Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., a 1905 opinion that has been frequently quoted:
[A] corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general
rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but when

36
MAURICE WORMSER, THE DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION
CORPORATION PROBLEMS 8–9 (1927).
37
Id.
38
Id. (internal citations omitted).
39
61 S.E. 794 (Va. 1908); WORMSER, supra note 36, at 26.
40
Rohleder, 61 S.E. at 794.
41
Id. at 796 (internal citation omitted).
42
WORMSER, supra note 36, at 27.

AND

ALLIED
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the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard
43
the corporation as an association of persons.

Justice Cardozo adopted a somewhat more nuanced approach to
44
veil piercing in Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway Company. In Berkey, the
court considered an attempt by a personal injury claimant to pierce
the veil of a street-car company to reach its owner, a corporation that
45
owned all of the company’s stock. What is so instructive about this
case is that the court assumed that if it held the parent company liable for the torts of its subsidiary, it would have the legal effect of treat46
ing the two companies as one. That, in turn, would mean that the
parent corporation was operating a railroad without the authority to
do so because New York law required any operator of a railway franchise to obtain the prior approval of the Public Service Commission;
47
and furthermore, lack of approval was a criminal offense. Only the
subsidiary had the necessary approval to operate the line on which
48
the plaintiff was injured. Although the lack of approval was not at
issue, Justice Cardozo treated the case as though it were, thus implying that piercing cannot be considered only in light of the claim at
49
issue. Rather, the opinion implies that a court should ignore a corporation’s separate existence for purposes of satisfying a tort claim
only if it would ignore that separateness for all purposes. This more
holistic approach to veil piercing is instructive. It requires a court to
consider what a decision to pierce says about the pierced entity and
the party being held liable under a piercing theory. Though fre50
quently cited for its compelling language, the nuanced approach of
Berkey has been eclipsed by a more formalistic approach to veil piercing. Typically, courts have operationalized the notion of “abusing the
corporate privilege” with tests or factors to determine, in a rather rote
43
United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis.
1905).
44
155 N.E. 914 (N.Y. 1927).
45
Id. at 915.
46
See id. (“The acceptance of that conclusion would reduce the statute to futility.
The defendant, if it uses or operates its subsidiary’s route, is either a coadventurer or
a principal or at least a licensee.”).
47
See id.
48
See id.
49
See id.
50
See, e.g., Rebecca J. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing for All Limited Liability Entities:
Forcing the Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 109 n.81
(2001) (noting that Berkey is “one of the most frequently cited opinions” in the veil
piercing context).
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fashion, whether the “corporate privilege” has been abused. Although there is some variation from state to state and from opinion
to opinion, commonly this approach employs two tests: (1) whether
the controlling shareholder and the corporation are alter egos of one
another, or, in other words, whether the controlling shareholder
dominated the corporation so that it had no separate existence of its
own; and (2) whether justice requires ignoring the corporate fiction
51
because it is utilized to perpetrate a fraud or injustice. Some courts
add a third test: whether an equitable result will be achieved by disre52
garding the corporate form. It would be an odd case, however,
where the first two tests are satisfied but the third is not. Moreover,
53
the equitable aspect of the piercing doctrine has the effect of providing a post-hoc rationalization for the apparently haphazard way in
54
which the doctrine is applied.
Under the first test, courts often consider whether corporate
formalities such as the creation of a board of directors, the appointment of corporate officers, and the maintenance of corporate bank
55
accounts and records have been observed. The absence of such ac51

See, e.g., Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 569–70 (7th
Cir. 1985) (“First, there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual [or other corporation] no
longer exist; and second, circumstances must be such that adherence to the fiction of
separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice.”); Micciche v. Billings, 727 P.2d 367, 373 (Colo. 1986).
[I]f it is shown that shareholders used the corporate entity as a mere
instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs without regard
to separate and independent corporate existence, or for the purpose of
defeating or evading important legislative policy, or in order to perpetrate a fraud or wrong on another, equity will permit the corporate
form to be disregarded and will hold the shareholders personally responsible for the corporation’s improper actions.
Micciche, 727 P.2d at 373.
52
See, e.g., Phillips v. Englewood Post No. 322 Veterans of Foreign Wars, Inc., 139
P.3d 639, 644 (Colo. 2006) (“Third, the court must evaluate whether an equitable
result will be achieved by disregarding the corporate form and holding the shareholder personally liable for the acts of the business entity.”).
53
See, e.g., Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Constr. & Paving, Inc., 447 A.2d 406,
411 (Conn. 1982).
54
See, e.g., Thomson v. L.C. Roney & Co., 246 P.2d 1017 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952).
55
Courts have identified a number of factors relevant to the first test; one fairly
comprehensive list is presented in Assoc. Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal.
Rptr. 806, 813–15 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (internal citations omitted):
[1] Commingling of funds and other assets, failure to segregate funds
of the separate entities, and the unauthorized diversion of corporate
funds or assets to other than corporate uses; [2] the treatment by an
individual of the assets of the corporation as his own; [3] the failure to
obtain authority to issue stock or to subscribe to or issue the same; [4]
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tions indicates that the controlling shareholder is not respecting the
corporation as a separate legal entity and supports a judicial decision
to ignore it as well. Under this test, courts also consider whether the
entity has been adequately capitalized—although, technically, ade56
quate capitalization has little to do with corporate separateness. Capitalization does, however, have salience in the second test, which inquires into the consequences of piercing the veil. But this second test
is reached only if the first test is satisfied.
The second veil-piercing test typically is not a major hurdle to a
plaintiff’s recovery. Of necessity, a plaintiff has already proven that
the owners did not respect the separate existence of the entity—that
is, the owners have abused the privilege granted to them by the
state—and that the plaintiff’s claim has not been paid. A “fraud or
the holding out by an individual that he is personally liable for the
debts of the corporation; [5] the failure to maintain minutes or adequate corporate records, and the confusion of the records of the separate entities; [6] the identical equitable ownership in the two entities;
[7] the identification of the equitable owners thereof with the domination and control of the two entities; [8] identification of the directors
and officers of the two entities in the responsible supervision and management; [9] sole ownership of all of the stock in a corporation by one
individual or the members of a family; [10] the use of the same office
or business location; [11] the employment of the same employees
and / or attorney; [12] the failure to adequately capitalize a corporation; [13] the total absence of corporate assets, and undercapitalization; [14] the use of a corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality or
conduit for a single venture or the business of an individual or another
corporation; [15] the concealment and misrepresentation of the identity of the responsible ownership, management and financial interest,
or concealment of personal business activities; [16] the disregard of legal formalities and the failure to maintain arm’s length relationships
among related entities; [17] the use of the corporate entity to procure
labor, services or merchandise for another person or entity; [18] the
diversion of assets from a corporation by or to a stockholder or other
person or entity, to the detriment of creditors, or the manipulation of
assets and liabilities between entities so as to concentrate the assets in
one and the liabilities in another; [19] the contracting with another
with intent to avoid performance by use of a corporate entity as a shield
against personal liability, or the use of a corporation as a subterfuge of
illegal transactions; [20] and the formation and use of a corporation to
transfer to it the existing liability of another person or entity.
Id.
56

Nevertheless, there is some authority for the idea that inadequate capitalization alone is sufficient to justify piercing. See PRESSER, supra note 10, § 1:9 (citing cases from California). As Professor Clark notes, however, state legislatures could
mandate minimal initial capitalization for corporations and what he calls “capital
maintenance rules” to protect involuntary corporate creditors. See Robert Clark, The
Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505, 551–52 (1977); see also
William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43
U. PITT. L. REV. 868–69 (1982) (developing the same idea).
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injustice” would result, some courts have said, if the plaintiff’s claim
57
remains unpaid. In an oft-cited case, Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, the
creditor was a lessor, and the corporate debtor, the lessee, was with58
out assets. This lack of capitalization, together with the fact that the
individual defendant bought no stock, made no capital contributions,
kept no minutes, and elected no officers, was sufficient to justify
59
piercing the corporate veil. The fraud or injustice would seem to be
simply nonpayment. One court has said that creating a corporation
to avoid personal liability “constitutes the type of injustice” that satis60
fies the second test.
Analysis in the LLC context follows a similar pattern, with courts
focusing on the extent to which the owners treated the LLC as a sep61
arate entity. Because “formalities” are not an issue in the operation
62
of an LLC, courts generally focus on other factors, such as the use of
the entity’s bank accounts to pay personal expenses, failure to maintain separate records, use of common facilities by the owners and the
63
company, and inadequate capitalization. If the plaintiff establishes
that the entity is so dominated, the court turns its attention to the
second test where, as in corporate cases, the plaintiff is likely to pre64
vail.
Courts and scholars often consider a second doctrine in concert
with veil piercing—the law of agency. Under this doctrine, the owners of an entity may be held liable for the entity’s obligations in both
tort and contract if the entity is an agent of the owners because, under traditional agency principles, the principal is liable for the obliga65
tions if the agent was acting within the scope of its employment.
This is not, strictly speaking, veil piercing because it does not turn on
57
See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. West Dixie Enters., Inc., 190 F.3d 1191, 1194 (11th Cir.
1999) (noting, with reference to the second test, that funds siphoned out of the corporation by the shareholders were “unavailable to meet [the corporation’s] remedial
obligations”).
58
939 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1991).
59
Id. at 212–13.
60
Autrey v. 22 Tex. Servs. Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 735, 746 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
61
See generally Ann K. Wooster, Construction and Application of LLC Acts—Issues Relating to Personal Liability of Individual Members and Managers of LLCs as to Third Parties,
47 A.L.R. 6th 1 (2009) (collecting cases).
62
See Kaycee Land & Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 328 (Wyo. 2002); Westmeyer v. Flynn, 889 N.E.2d 671, 678 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
63
See Litchfield Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Howell, 799 A.2d 298, 313 (Conn. App. Ct.
2002).
64
See id. (Second, the court “consider[s] whether the court properly found that
Mary Ann Howell used that control and dominance to perpetrate a wrong.”).
65
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 (2006).
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factors such as whether corporate formalities were followed or
whether there was adequate capitalization. Yet when applying agency
principles, courts often look to these factors, perhaps because a key
factor in determining whether one is an agent of another is the de66
gree of control exercised over the purported agent. If a corporation
or LLC does not have the indicia of a separate entity—a functioning
governing body, separate bank accounts, etc—it is more likely that it
was subject to the domination and control of its owners. Nevertheless, the agency theory generally is confined to instances in which the
owner is an entity—typically a corporation—and the agent is a wholly
67
owned subsidiary. While there are other theories rationalizing veil
68
piercing, the “privilege theory” has been dominant.
66

See, e.g., A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981)
(holding that lender’s control over debtor was sufficient to render the debtor an
agent of the lender).
67
See, e.g., Henry v. St. Croix Alumina, LLC, No. 1999/0036, 2007 WL 6030275, at
*8 (D.V.I. Aug. 10, 2007) (“In Delaware, [a] court can pierce the corporate veil of an
entity . . . under an agency theory where the parent exercises dominion over the subsidiary. . . . Thus, [agency theory] require[s] the parent corporation to exercise a
certain degree of control over the subsidiary that would warrant piercing the corporate veil.”) (citations omitted).
68
See, e.g., Clark, supra note 56, at 541 (arguing that veil piercing is employed by
the courts when other doctrines, principally, fraudulent conveyance, are found lacking and moral precepts support denying limited liability for an entity’s owner). In
addition, some courts tweak the traditional two-factor test to develop what has been
called the “instrumentality rule” and the “identity rule.” PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL.,
BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS §§ 6.02–06, 10.03 (Aspen Pub. 2009) (addressing
“instrumentality” and “identity” doctrines). See also Bergesen v. Lindholm, 760 F.
Supp. 976, 987–88 (D. Conn. 1991) (comparing the two rules). The former is a
three-factor test requiring proof of
“(1) [c]ontrol, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to
this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of
its own; (2) that such control must have been used by the defendant to
commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or
other positive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in contravention
of plaintiff’s legal rights; and (3) that the aforesaid control and breach
of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained
of.”
Litchfield, 799 A.2d at 312–13 (quoting Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Constr. & Paving, Inc., 447 A.2d 406, 410 (1982)). The identity rule is a two-factor test:
If a plaintiff can show that there was such a unity of interest and ownership that the independence of the corporations had in effect ceased or
had never begun, an adherence to the fiction of separate identity
would serve only to defeat justice and equity by permitting the economic entity to escape liability arising out of an operation conducted by
one corporation for the benefit of the whole enterprise.
Id. at 315 (quoting Tomasso, 447 A.2d. at 411). It would appear that the identity rule
is more appropriate in the parent-subsidiary context, but the tests are not materially
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69

Piercing can occur in both tort and contract cases. Arguably,
the case for the former is more compelling than the latter. After all,
the creditor in a contract case chose its debtor and had an opportunity to assess the ability of the debtor to discharge its obligations. The
tort victim typically does not enjoy that luxury. Nevertheless, it appears that contract creditors, sometimes called voluntary creditors,
70
are at least as successful as tort creditors, or involuntary creditors.
In either case, the judicial focus on “formalities” makes little sense
because there is no causal connection between the failure to observe
some level of formality and the loss to the creditor. Yet, as Professor
Thompson’s data indicate, formalities clearly matter—courts pierce
the corporate veil in two-thirds of the cases in which it is found that
the individual defendant failed to observe corporate formalities, and
courts decline to pierce in over ninety percent of the cases in which
71
there was a finding that formalities were observed. These factors,
combined with the apparently random nature of veil piercing, have
prompted calls for its elimination as a legal doctrine. Professor Stephen Bainbridge, in an exhaustive analysis, concluded that no persu72
asive justification for the doctrine could be identified.
B. Economic Analysis
When an entity bears the consequences of torts committed by its
agents, it can insure against those torts and/or capitalize the entity
sufficiently to bear those costs. Some have argued that the owners of
the entity, or certain senior managers, should bear these costs if the
entity cannot, so as to deter entities from being undercapitalized or
73
underinsured and externalizing these costs to tort creditors. This
externalization is commonly characterized as a moral hazard—”the
incentive created by limited liability to transfer the cost of risky activi74
ties to creditors.” Such proposals, however, are problematic. To
different. In any event, in the Litchfield case the court found that both tests had been
satisfied.
69
See, e.g., John H. Matheson, Why Courts Pierce: An Empirical Study of Piercing the
Corporate Veil, 7 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 20 (2010) (providing data regarding court piercing statistics for both contract and tort cases).
70
See Thompson, supra note 10, at 1050.
71
Id. at 1063–65.
72
Bainbridge, supra note 15, at 514.
73
See Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 396 (2004) (pertaining to senior
managers); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1990–1991) (pertaining to entity owners).
74
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 104 (1985).
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start, the risk of personal liability would naturally discourage invest75
ment in business entities if investors risk liability, and employment,
if managers bear the risk. This is a social cost that must be weighed
against the presumed social benefit of limiting the externalization of
76
risk. Second, it is not altogether clear that businesses systematically
77
under-invest in avoiding loss. Indeed, businesses risk the investment
of their owners if they under-invest in safety measures and insurance.
Moreover, managers whose investment in the firm consists not only
of any equity they may own but also of the human capital they have
invested have a strong incentive to protect that human capital by in78
suring against risks. Owners and managers also have reputations to
protect, and under-investment that results in uncompensated claimants places those reputations at risk. Finally, and apart from reputational harm, managers and owners may recognize a moral obligation to compensate those injured by the entity that they manage or in
which they invest and thus capitalize and/or insure the firm appropriately.
Of equal importance is the question of who is the more efficient
79
risk bearer. For some risks, it may be the case that an injured party
is better able to insure against the risk and to do so at a lower cost.
Expanding the liability of owners and managers for such risks under
some notion of veil piercing would, of course, be economically ineffi75

Id. at 91; see also William H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 371, 371 (1981) (“The purpose of limited liability is to promote commerce and
industrial growth by encouraging shareholders to make capital contributions to corporations without subjecting all of their personal wealth to the risks of the business.”); Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L.
REV. 259, 262 (1967).
76
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 74, at 104 (“Externalization of risk imposes
social costs and thus is undesirable.”). But see PRESSER, supra note 10, § 1:7 (arguing
that investors are focused on the amount of potential returns from an investment,
not the potential liability). Professor Presser also argues that the costs of monitoring
that would arise from unlimited liability are manageable and not, alone, a reason for
limited liability. Id. § 1:7, at 1-39.
77
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 74, at 104 (“[T]he magnitude of the externality under limited liability has been exaggerated. As Richard Posner has demonstrated, there is no externality with respect to voluntary creditors. In addition, firms
have incentives to insure for amounts greater than their existing capital. The insurance company becomes a contract creditor, reducing the externality.”) (footnote
omitted).
78
Id. at 107 (“A firm with insurance against tort claims is less likely to become
bankrupt, and thus less likely to impose costs on managers and other employees. Insurance thus induces people to make firm-specific investments of human capital.”).
79
Id. at 101–02 (“In some circumstances creditors might have a comparative advantage in assessing the riskiness of a transaction initially and superior ability to monitor the conduct of the firm for the duration of the agreement.”).
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cient. Moreover, even in those instances in which the entity was the
most efficient risk bearer and, ex ante, under-invested in safety and
insurance, we must consider whether a broad rule that imposes liability on individuals is warranted. Such a rule may cause owners and
managers to over-invest in precautionary behavior and insurance so
as to avoid uncompensated, or under-compensated, injury to relatively few injured parties.
Professor Timothy Glynn, in a recent article, seeks to overcome
these concerns by arguing that imposing vicarious liability on senior
officers for an entity’s torts is justified because they are the most efficient risk bearers and “are in the best position to monitor and avoid
80
risks.” Managerial aversion to risk and the risk of over-deterrence
are not concerns under his approach because such officers are now
part of a mobile “managerial class” and that mobility means that their
81
human capital investment is therefore reduced. Professor Glynn also argues that over-deterrence “will be constrained by their incentivebased compensation, the equities markets, controlling shareholder
82
oversight, and other factors.” But these responses miss the mark for
several reasons. First, only officers of publicly held corporations are
part of any managerial class. Officers in closely held entities may
have a considerable human capital investment in their firms, which
83
makes them risk averse. Of equal importance, the degree of human
capital one has invested in his or her firm and the extent to which
that investment motivates the manager to be risk averse is entirely
separate from the affect of potential personal liability. One’s humancapital investment may not affect one’s aversion to risk, but liability
surely will.
Second, it seems doubtful that any mix of compensation and
other factors could adequately compensate for the risk of unlimited
84
liability in many settings. The only obvious contractual undertaking
that would compensate for the risk is a right to indemnification by
the firm. Of course, such a right already exists as a matter of agency

80

Glynn, supra note 73, at 334.
Id.
82
Id.
83
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1461, 1472 (1989).
84
See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387, 434 (1992) (“Making officers and directors personally liable may create undesirable incentives to be too cautious, may drive capable
people away from such jobs, and may provide inadequate compensation if complete
insurance coverage is not available.”).
81
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85

law, and if, somehow, the law were to impose vicarious liability on
managers, contractual indemnification would become the norm.
Finally, and most importantly, one might question Professor
86
Glynn’s premise that officers are efficient risk bearers. This view assumes that senior officers should be vicariously liable, as is an em87
ployer under the doctrine of respondeat superior, because a senior
officer is “the person most able to prevent the tortious conduct and
88
spread the risk.” But often, that is simply not the case. In complex
businesses—and many closely held entities operate such businesses—
it is unrealistic to expect any officer to be able to assess the risk and
monitor the activities of numerous employees and other agents. With
regard to tortious conduct, which is the focus of Professor Glynn’s
proposal, injured plaintiffs do have a claim against the wrongdoer
and possibly against the person or persons who had a duty to super89
vise or control the wrongdoer.
By assumption, then, Professor
Glynn’s theory of vicarious liability for officers only applies when the
officer did not have the responsibility to monitor the tortfeasor.
By comparison, traditional notions of respondeat superior impose liability on an employer in part because the employer hired the
wrongdoer and was in the best position to monitor and control his or
90
her performance. An officer is not necessarily in that position, and
the risk of vicarious liability would deter non-owners from agreeing to
serve as managers or would result in their retention at a higher level
of compensation. If one were committed to identifying natural persons within a firm to bear liability, the logical persons would be the
board of directors or other governing body of the firm. Imposing vicarious liability on that body, however, would radically change its responsibilities and composition. That is, perhaps, why no one has ever
suggested that, as a matter of public policy, boards should be personally liable for the tortious conduct of a firm.

85

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.14 (2006).
Glynn, supra note 73, at 334.
87
This is the doctrine under which liability is imposed upon an employer for the
acts of his employees committed in the course and scope of their employment. 3 AM.
JUR. 2D Agency § 261 (2011).
88
Glynn, supra note 73, at 335.
89
See, e.g., Godfrey v. Iverson, 559 F.3d 569, 571 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding professional athlete liable for negligent supervision of his bodyguard); Estate of Countryman v. Farmers Coop. Ass’n, 679 N.W.2d 598 (Iowa 2004) (holding manager liable
for negligent supervision); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.05 (2006).
90
See, e.g., Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853, 858 (8th
Cir. 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006).
86
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Conventional economic analysis generally recognizes that a regime of limited liability is economically efficient and exceptions to it
ought to rest on a sound basis. For instance, Professors Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel considered the appropriateness of veil
piercing in their article on limited liability, Limited Liability and the
91
Corporation. They argue that limited liability for corporations is justified because it facilitates trading in corporate shares and business di92
versification by corporate managers. Thus, veil piercing does, and
ought to, occur “where limited liability provides minimal gains from
improved liquidity and diversification, while creating a high probabil93
ity that a firm will engage in a socially excessive level of risk taking.”
This is, of course, most likely in close corporations, which account for
94
all veil-piercing cases. There are no reported cases in which shareholders of a publicly held, or even a widely held, corporation were
held liable on a piercing theory.
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel then assert that veil piercing
is more appropriate in cases involving tort than in cases involving
contract because voluntary creditors can protect themselves while in95
voluntary creditors cannot. Moreover, the moral hazard problem
exists with respect to involuntary creditors because they do not have
the ability to assess the risk that they face and, thus, cannot price it
96
accordingly. But Professors Easterbrook and Fischel maintain that
even voluntary creditors should be able to pierce the veil when they
have been misled as to the entity’s financial situation because, under
97
those circumstances, they cannot accurately assess the risk. This
view might be questioned, as the actors who misled the creditor
should be personally liable on a theory of fraud or, at least, negligent
misrepresentation. In either case, the piercing remedy would seem
to be superfluous.
Finally, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel argue that undercapitalization should be a basis for piercing for both voluntary and invo-

91

See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 74.
Id. at 96–97.
93
Id. at 109.
94
See Oh, supra note 6, at 110 (“Veil-piercing claims prevail exclusively against
close corporations.”).
95
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 74, at 112.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 106. While not mentioned in their article, arguably veil piercing is inappropriate under those circumstances because the creditor should have an independent tort claim arising out of the misrepresentation, and this claim would be valid
against any individuals who made the misrepresentation.
92
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98

luntary creditors. With respect to the former, they argue that creditors, particularly smaller trade creditors, should be able to assume
that firms have adequate capitalization, which they define as “an
amount of equity that is within the ordinary range for the business in
question,” and can pierce the veil if it is inadequate, unless such in99
adequacy was disclosed. They note that the firm is in a better posi100
tion to assess its capitalization than are its creditors. As to involuntary creditors, it would follow a priori that if veil piercing is
appropriate for voluntary creditors in the event of undercapitalization, it is more appropriate for involuntary creditors.
The problem with this rather generous view of veil piercing is
that judging the adequacy of a firm’s capitalization is no easy matter.
Using the rubric of Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, one might ask
101
what the “ordinary range” of capitalization is in any business.
Should the question be litigated, the parties would likely be limited to
expert testimony, which would surely be in conflict. The problem is
particularly acute because the judgment is made in retrospect, after
the liability has been incurred and after the judgment against the entity has been returned unsatisfied. Moreover, this view of veil piercing
raises a thorny fairness problem—why should the shareholders of inadequately capitalized closely held entities risk personal liability while
those in publicly held entities do not? Would this not discourage investment in closely held entities and thereby result in a social cost?
Finally, allowing veil piercing on the basis of undercapitalization
alone would generate a delicate question of damages: Should the recovery be limited to the amount that plaintiff would have recovered if
the entity had been adequately capitalized, even if that amount is less
than the plaintiff’s loss? This recognizes, of course, that even wellcapitalized entities suffer financial reversals and the inability to pay
their debts. This is perhaps why veil piercing on the basis of under102
capitalization alone is rare, if not nonexistent.

98

Id. at 113.
Id.
100
Id.
101
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 74, at 113.
102
See BRANSON ET AL., BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL STRUCTURES, GOVERNANCE,
AND POLICY 220 (2008) (“[A]s case law shows, inadequate capitalization alone is rarely sufficient to pierce the corporate veil.”); Bainbridge, supra note 15, at 521 (observing the “courts’s well-nigh universal refusal to treat undercapitalization, standing
alone, as dispositive”); Glynn, supra note 73, at 355 (“The mutual exclusivity of limited shareholder liability and ‘undercapitalization’ is why no court, to my knowledge, has pierced based on this factor alone.”).
99
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Consistent with this view, Professor Stephen Presser has observed
that the concept of limited liability for corporate shareholders arose
in the nineteenth century to encourage less wealthy but enterprising
103
entrepreneurs to create new businesses. The creation of new businesses continues to be an important societal goal, and the centrality
of limited liability continues to be a legislative priority. The last few
decades have seen the advent and dramatic growth of the LLC, now
104
the predominant form of new business in America. Moreover, state
legislatures have afforded limited liability for partners in general
partnerships by providing the option of a limited liability partner105
ship, and for general partners in limited partnerships through the
106
limited liability limited partnership.
These developments send a
message that limited liability is a legislative priority that should not be
undercut by judicial exceptions.
C. Summary
The economic analysis of veil piercing ignores the standard rubric of veil-piercing language and instead focuses more broadly on
whether limited liability is economically efficient. Under this view,
whether the entity was meticulous in its record keeping is irrelevant.
The third party who suffered a loss, whether in contract or tort, is not
protected from that loss by any such formalities. Rather, what is relevant for contract creditors is the extent to which the entity provided
misleading information and, for tort creditors, the extent to which
the entity adequately insured itself against loss. But the veil-piercing
doctrine, although recognizing that such considerations are relevant,
has proceeded instead on a formalistic basis. The results of applying
the formula are unpredictable, which accounts for the large body of
litigation on the issue.
107
For well-advised companies, veil piercing is thus easy to avoid.
It seems fair to conclude, then, that the doctrine has a punitive aspect
103

Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 155–56 (1992).
104
“The number of new LLCs formed in America in 2007 now outpaces the number of new corporations formed by a margin of nearly two to one.” Rodney D.
Chrisman, LLCs are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of the Number of New
LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between 2004–2007 and How LLCs
Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 460 (2010). In
several “bellwether” states such as Delaware and Colorado, over three new LLCs are
formed for every one new corporation formed. Id.
105
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(c) (1997).
106
UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 404(c) (2001).
107
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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and a deterrent effect. The message to entity organizers is clear: if
you seek limited liability, take care to treat the entity you formed as a
separate entity, on pain of personal liability. Thus, to the extent that
moral hazard exists, it is inadequately addressed by the traditional
rubric. A survey of reported veil-piercing cases conducted by Professor Robert Thompson disclosed that courts pierce the corporate veil
108
about 40% of the time that such a claim is asserted, but surprisingly,
109
courts do so more often in contract cases than in tort cases. In fact,
110
tort claimants successfully pierced the veil in just 31% of the cases,
111
compared to 42% for contract claimants. The data suggest that deterring moral hazard may not be a large factor in piercing decisions.
In addition, while the proof of misrepresentation was highly corre112
lated with a decision to pierce, misrepresentation was a factor in on113
ly 169 cases, or about 10% of the pool of cases. This suggests that
the strongest basis for piercing in contract cases was rarely present.
In short, the basis for holding the owners of any entity liable for
the entity’s obligation is thin, resting on formalism with little attention paid to the economic consequences of limited liability. The privilege doctrine, which is the underlying basis for the veil-piercing
tests, is itself difficult to rationalize. It is founded on little more than
the assertion that if the owner of the entity does not respect its separate existence, then neither should the courts. In the decades since
Professor Wormser posed that argument, the incorporation process
has become increasingly simplified and available as a matter of
114
115
right. Organizing an LLC is similarly quite easy. Finally, even if
operating as a corporation or LLC could fairly be characterized as a
privilege, it does not follow that failing to adhere to formalities constitutes an “abuse” of that privilege or that a claimant should be able
to reach the personal assets of the owners. A more logical result from
a finding of abuse would be that the “privilege” should be revoked by
the state but not retroactively. Section 14.30(a)(1)(ii) of the Model
Business Corporation Act (MBCA) authorizes the court to dissolve a
108

Thompson, supra note 10, at 1048.
Id. at 1058.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 1063 (Piercing occurred in 94% of the cases in which the presence of misrepresentation was cited by the court.).
113
Id.
114
BRANSON ET AL., supra note 102, at 5.
115
All that is necessary is a simple filing, typically called “Articles of Organization”
and containing minimal information about the entity, with the Secretary of State. See
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 202–03 (1996).
109
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corporation if “the corporation has continued to exceed or abuse the
116
authority conferred upon it by law.”
Thus, because the statutory
drafters have provided a remedy, judicial veil piercing is arguably un117
authorized.
In addition, the privilege notion of corporate law is of questionable value in characterizing limited liability entities. Many scholars
and commentators view corporations (and, by extension, all limited
118
liability entities) as a “nexus of contracts.” That is, the entity ought
not be characterized as a separate legal person but rather as a series
of separate contracts, both implicit and explicit, among and between
the various actors within the firm and providers of goods and services
119
from outside the firm.
Under this view, the corporate or other limited liability entity statute merely provides default rules. The parties can contract around these default rules, but for the sake of efficiency, the default rules ought to be those that the parties would
likely agree to were they to bargain over them. While it is beyond the
scope of this Article to provide an analysis of whether limited liability
is the appropriate default rule under this contractarian approach, two
observations are in order. First, all corporate codes and LLC acts
provide that limited liability is a default rule, so it is implicitly a part
of all dealings between the entity and third parties. Second, sound
analysis supports the idea that this default rule is efficient for both
publicly held and closely held entities and in both contract and tort
120
settings.
Veil piercing raises yet another fundamental question, this one
of prudential importance: Do courts exceed their prudential role
when grafting a remedy onto a statute? This question should be considered in light of other provisions in the corporate code and LLC
acts that address the equitable concerns that underlie the veilpiercing doctrine. Most veil-piercing cases, whether concerning corporations or LLCs, involve situations in which the owners of the enti-

116

MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30(a)(1)(ii) (1984).
But cf. Litchfield Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Howell, 799 A.2d 298 (Conn. App. Ct.
2002).
118
See, e.g., Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 99, 100 (1989).
119
See generally BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND
OPERATION 31–41 (1997) (summarizing nexus of contracts theory); FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
(1996); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History in Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439 (2001); Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1395 (1989).
120
Bainbridge, supra note 15, at 485–507.
117
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ty have distributed entity assets to themselves, leaving the entity unable to pay its obligations to creditors. The entity statutes, as well as
other provisions of federal and state law, discussed below, deal direct121
ly with this situation.
Taken together, these provisions provide a
legislative solution to the most common problem addressed in veilpiercing cases.
The idea, however, that state courts act without jurisdiction, or at
least unadvisedly, when grafting equitable remedies onto a state sta122
tute is not widely accepted. While federal courts are limited in their
123
ability to create common law, the conventional wisdom is that state
124
courts are not. This Article challenges this conventional wisdom, at
least in the context of business association statutes. The statutes are
crafted to balance the interests of the various constituencies of the
entity—owners, managers, and third parties dealing with the entity—
regarding the rights and obligations of the owners and managers. A
business association statute serves no other purpose, and it arguably
pre-empts the field on the issues it resolves. Judicial decisions that alter this balance by allowing a creditor to pierce the veil of an entity
125
and hold an owner liable result in legislative push-backs, add transaction costs as parties seek to contract around the judicial incur126
127
sion, or create uncertainty and additional litigation.
This is un121

See discussion infra Part III.
See Zechariah Chafee Jr., Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REV.
1065, 1092 (1949); Mary Siegel, The Dangers of Equitable Remedies, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 86, 88 (2009).
123
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). See generally Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 853 (1982) (discussing state alter ego laws and the inability of federal common
law to disregard the corporate entity).
124
See Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.
125
In response to Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986), a case in
which the Texas Supreme Court announced a broad test for veil piercing, the Texas
legislature amended its corporate code to drastically limit the doctrine. The court in
Castleberry held that to pierce the corporate veil, a claimant need only show constructive fraud, which the court defined as “the breach of some legal or equitable duty
which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency
to deceive others, to violate a confidence, or to injure public interests.” Id. at 273.
The legislative response is in section 21.223(b) of the Texas Business Organizations
Code, which provides that a claimant must prove that a shareholder “caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual
fraud on the [claimant] primarily for the direct personal benefit of the [shareholder].” TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(b) (2009). See generally Elizabeth S. Miller,
Are There Limits on Limited Liability? Owner Liability Protection and Piercing the Veil of Texas Business Entities, 43 TEX. J. BUS. L. 405, 407–11 (2009) (discussing the statute).
126
Bainbridge, supra note 15, at 481.
127
Id.
122
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fortunate, as one of the main goals of corporate law is, or at least
ought to be, to provide predictability so that entrepreneurs can con128
fidently invest.
It is in this context that this Article considers the wisdom of veil
piercing to hold non-owners liable. Before reaching that question,
the next Part considers the liability of entity managers aside from veilpiercing claims. In effect, Part III provides the alternative to veil
piercing and implicitly asks the question as to whether an additional
veil-piercing cause of action is needed.
III. HOLDING MANAGERS LIABLE
A. Managerial Liability in the Absence of Veil Piercing
The appropriateness of veil piercing should be considered in
light of other doctrines that hold entity managers liable for what
might be characterized as entity obligations. This Part demonstrates
that there are several theories on which personal liability attaches and
raises the obvious question as to whether an additional one—veil
piercing—serves as critical a function as the courts and supporters of
the doctrine assume. Interestingly, in the recent Colorado veilpiercing cases discussed below, it appears that such a cause of action
existed; that is, the Colorado courts had ample reasons to hold the
129
managers liable without resorting to veil piercing.
1.

Tort Actions

In tort actions, the most important basis for holding managers
liable is for their own wrongful conduct, an exception to non-liability
130
carved out in corporate and LLC statutes. For instance, in Weber v.
U.S. Sterling Securities, Inc., a Delaware LLC sent a business solicitation
via fax to the plaintiff in violation of a federal statute that prohibited
131
such solicitations.
Two individuals who owned and operated the

128

See id. at 514 n.166 (“It is obviously important that the Delaware corporate law
have stability and predictability.”) (quoting Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 220
(Del. Ch. 1974)).
129
See infra Part III.B.
130
See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2) (1984); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §
303 cmt. 2 (1996). See generally 2 LARRY RIBSTEIN & ROBERT KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND
KEATINGE ON LLCS §§ 12:1–12.4 (2d ed. 2005) (noting that all LLC acts expressly
provide that members and managers are not liable for the debts, obligations, or other liabilities of the LLC, but that this limitation “does not protect the members or
managers from direct individual liability for their own wrongs, such as torts and professional malpractice”).
131
924 A.2d 816, 819–20 (Conn. 2007).
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LLC were named as defendants and prevailed on summary judgment;
132
the trial court concluded that they could not be personally liable.
The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that claims under
the statute “generally are viewed as sounding in tort” and that the individual defendants, although they purported to act on behalf of the
133
LLC, may themselves have violated the statute.
In some ways, Weber is an easy case—the individual defendants
were alleged to have actually committed the wrongful act. A bit more
attenuated than Weber is the case Estate of Countryman v. Farmer’s Cooperative Association, in which the defendant’s wrongful act was more in
134
the nature of nonfeasance than misfeasance. The case arose out of
135
a residential natural gas explosion resulting in death.
One of the
defendants, the manager of the LLC that supplied the propane, was
alleged to be at least partially at fault for failing to properly warn the
136
propane users about the attendant dangers.
This negligence was
enough, in the court’s view, to hold the manager directly liable to the
137
injured parties.
The Estate of Countryman decision pushes the boundaries of direct liability for managers of a limited liability entity because the defendant, at least arguably, did not have a direct duty to the plaintiffs
or their decedents. The manager owed a duty to the LLC that employed him, and many courts have ruled that an agent is not liable for
damages to a third party for a breach of the duty that the agent owes
138
to the principal. That is, many courts have drawn a distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, with the former a basis for liabil139
ity but not the latter. The principal in the Estate of Countryman—the
132

Id.
Id. at 825.
134
See 679 N.W.2d 598, 599–601 (Iowa 2004).
135
Id. at 599.
136
Id. at 599–600.
137
Id. at 605.
138
See, e.g., Coker v. Dollar, 846 F.2d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 1988).
139
Peguero v. 601 Realty Corp., 873 N.Y.S.2d 17, 21 (App. Div. 2009) (“The
‘commission of a tort’ doctrine permits personal liability to be imposed on a corporate officer for misfeasance or malfeasance, i.e., an affirmative tortious act; personal
liability cannot be imposed on a corporate officer for nonfeasance, i.e., a failure to
act.”) (citing Michaels v. Lispenard Holding Corp., 201 N.Y.S.2d 611, 614 (App. Div.
1960); see also MLM LLC v. Karamouzis, 767 N.Y.S.2d 620 (App. Div. 2003). See generally 3A WILLIAM FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 1161, n.5 (collecting cases). But see id. at n.9 (collecting contrary
cases). Even in New York, however, where the courts have embraced a misfeasance / nonfeasance distinction, the potential liability of corporate and LLC managers
is far from clear. In Haire v. Bonelli, 870 N.Y.S.2d 591, 594 (App. Div. 2008), for in133
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supplier of the propane—presumably owed a duty to warn and would
140
be liable if it failed to discharge that duty, but its agents, arguably,
did not owe such a duty. By contrast, if the agent had negligently
damaged the plaintiff’s premises while installing a heater, the agent’s
liability is clearer; the agent owed a duty to both its principal and to
the customer to exercise due care while on the customer’s premis141
es. Nevertheless, the trend of the law seems to be in the direction
of eliminating the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance
142
in determining the liability of an agent, and the court in Estate of
Countryman did not even discuss the issue.
2.

Contract Actions

Corporate codes, LLC acts, and statutes that regulate “fraudulent transfers” all provide direct statutory claims against managers of
limited liability entities and also often provide a remedy otherwise
143
sought in a veil-piercing case.
For instance, corporate codes and
LLC acts prohibit the distribution of entity assets to owners if the ent144
ity is insolvent or would be rendered insolvent by the distribution,
and a director or manager who authorizes a distribution in violation
of these sections is liable to the entity for the amount of the distribu145
tion in excess of what the statute allows. There are procedural barriers in these sorts of provisions, such as the MBCA, which requires a
stance, which arose out of a shooting at a shopping mall, the court refused to dismiss
a claim against individual defendants who were officers or members of the defendant
corporations or LLCs. The plaintiff had alleged that these individual defendants
“participated in the commission of a tort in furtherance of company business or to
benefit the business, namely reducing or eliminating mall security to maximize profits.” Id. This allegation is fairly close to an allegation of nonfeasance and points out
the difficulty of distinguishing between the two. Haire might also be explained as peculiar to the law of property. See also Gray (ex rel. Rudd) v. Beverly EnterprisesMississippi, Inc., 390 F.3d 400, 410 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate
hands-on contact by the defendants, but such activity does not seem required to impose personal liability under Mississippi law. One may easily be a direct participant
in tortious conduct by merely authorizing or negligently failing to remedy misconduct by one’s subordinates.”).
140
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) (There is a duty to warn end users of products “known to be dangerous for intended use.”).
141
See id. § 284; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 13, 343, 350, 352
(1958).
142
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 cmt. a (2006) (An “agent’s tort liability
extends to negligent acts and omissions as well as intentional conduct.”).
143
ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 2.4, at 71–74 (1986).
144
See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40(c) (1984); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §
405(a) (1996).
145
See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.33 (1984); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 406
(1996).
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plaintiff to prove that the director failed to comply with the standard
146
of conduct for directors set forth in section 8.30 of the MBCA. But
these barriers reflect a legislative judgment on the circumstances under which an actor in a limited liability entity ought to be liable for
his or her conduct, a judgment that may be undercut by a judicial
veil-piercing decision.
Similarly, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA),
147
adopted by forty-four states, gives creditors a remedy when a debtor
has transferred assets with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors or has made a transfer of assets or incurred an obligation
without adequate consideration (termed a “constructively fraudulent”
148
transfer under the UFTA), if certain conditions are present. As in
the case of recoveries under the entity statutes for improper distributions, discussed above, there are certain hurdles for a creditor149
plaintiff to clear under the UFTA. For instance, as the introductory
note to the UFTA indicates, a transfer that is
constructively fraudulent because insolvency concurs with or follows failure to receive adequate consideration is voidable only by
a creditor in existence at the time the transfer occurs or the obligation is incurred. Either an existing or subsequent creditor may
avoid a transfer or obligation for inadequate consideration when
146

To succeed on a claim that a director or directors made an “unlawful distribution,” the action must be commenced within two years after the distribution and the
plaintiff must show that the offending director(s) failed to act in good faith and did
not reasonably believe the action was in the best interests of the corporation. See
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984) (“(a) Each member of the board of directors,
when discharging the duties of a director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a
manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.33 (1984) (“(1) the liability of a director . . . is
barred unless it is commenced within two years after the date.”). This language in
section 8.30 codifies in part the “business judgment rule.” Application of the business judgment rule presents a heavy burden of proof for a plaintiff to overcome and
adversely affects a plaintiff’s chance for success.
147
GRANT W. NEWTON, BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACCOUNTING: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 250 (2009) (“At least 44 states and the District of Columbia have adopted
the UFTA.”).
148
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT (UFTA) § 4 (1984). If any of the following
conditions is present, the transfer is deemed to be constructively fraudulent and subject to recovery by the creditor:
(1) the debtor was left by the transfer or obligation with unreasonably
small assets for a transaction or the business in which he was engaged;
(2) the debtor intended to incur, or believed that he would incur,
more debts than he would be able to pay; or (3) the debtor was insolvent at the time or as a result of the transfer or obligation.
UFTA, Prefatory Note at 3, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/
ulc/fnact99/1980s/ufta84.pdf.
149
See supra notes 143–48 and accompanying text.
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accompanied by the financial condition specified in § 4(a)(2)(i)
or the mental state specified in § 4(a)(2)(ii)
150

of the UFTA. Again, these and other limitations in the UFTA
may reflect a considered legislative judgment as to when a creditor
can void a transfer by an entity. While beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that the “preferential transfer” provisions of
151
federal bankruptcy law also provide a remedy in certain cases.
A final doctrine is worth considering here: the corporate trust
152
doctrine. This is a judicially created doctrine that imposes liability
on directors and managers of insolvent entities who favor their own
153
Obviously,
interests or claims over the claims of other creditors.
such transfers may (and likely do) run afoul of the creditor protections noted above and, to that extent, this doctrine is similar to veil
piercing. Like veil piercing, and unlike the statutory doctrines considered here, the corporate trust doctrine could render a director or
manager liable to creditors without regard to the amount of the of154
fending distribution.
The doctrine operates in an almost punitive
manner; an improper distribution renders the director or manager
liable to the creditor for the amount of the creditor’s claim, even if it
155
exceeds the amount of the improper distribution.
For this and
156
perhaps other reasons, creditors may prefer a cause of action based
on this doctrine over more limited statutory remedies.
The remedies discussed in this section are not frequently invoked. That is especially true with respect to creditor remedies set
forth in corporate codes and LLC acts. Given the availability of the
much more liberal remedy provided by veil piercing, this is not surprising.

150

UFTA, supra note 148, Prefatory Note at 3.
See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2006).
152
Alexander v. Anstine, 152 P.3d 497, 502 (Colo. 2007); New Crawford Valley,
Ltd. v. Benedict, 877 P.2d 1363, 1369 (Colo. App. 1993); James R. Ellis & Charles L.
Sayer, Trust Fund Doctrine Revisited, 24 WASH. L. REV. & ST. B.J. 134 (1949); FLETCHER,
supra note 139, §§ 7369, 5422.
153
See, e.g., In re Mortgage America Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1268–70 (5th Cir. 1983);
Bank of America v. Musselman, 222 F. Supp. 2d 792, 798 (E.D. Va. 2002).
154
See, e.g., Colborne Corp. v. Weinstein, No. 09CA0724, 2010 Colo. App. LEXIS
58 (Jan. 21, 2010), cert. granted, 2010 Colo. LEXIS 606 (Aug. 16, 2010) (No.
10SC143).
155
See Collie v. Becknell, 762 P.2d 727, 729 (Colo. App. 1988).
156
Statutory remedies often include a statute of limitations. See MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 8.33 (1984).
151
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B. Managerial Liability under Veil Piercing
Veil piercing against non-owners has not been universally accepted by the courts; a number of courts have considered, and rejected, a veil-piercing theory to impose liability on non-owners. An
early example of a court apparently requiring that a defendant have
an ownership interest in order to pierce the corporate veil is Riddle v.
Leuschner, which involved two corporations that were formed by the
157
Leuschner family in 1949.
The plaintiff, Riddle, was a creditor of
one of the corporations and sought to hold the defendants (husband,
wife, and son) liable, alleging that they were the alter egos of the cor158
poration.
Although the husband was the president of one of the
corporations and involved in the management of the other corpora159
The court
tion, he did not own any shares in either corporation.
held that because the husband did not have an ownership interest in
the corporations or share in their profits, “there was not such unity of
‘interest and ownership’ between . . . [the husband] and the corporations” to demonstrate that he was the alter ego of the corporations, a
160
necessary finding to pierce the corporate veil. The court went on to
hold that the wife’s ownership of one share in one of the corporations was “sufficient to permit holding her personally liable to creditors of that corporation provided that the alter ego doctrine [was]
161
otherwise applicable.”
This small amount of ownership also allowed her to be held liable for the other corporation’s debts because
the corporations were “controlled, dominated, managed, and operated by” the family so “that there was no separateness between them
162
and the corporations.”
Because the wife was also liable for the debt of the corporation
in which she did not hold an ownership interest, it was not entirely
clear whether an ownership interest is required in California. Two
subsequent Ninth Circuit decisions applying California law have held
that Riddle does require a defendant to hold an ownership interest to
163
164
pierce the corporate veil. In addition, courts in Ohio and Louisi165
ana have also indicated that ownership is a prerequisite to piercing.
157

335 P.2d 107, 108 (Cal. 1959).
Id.
159
Id. at 108–09.
160
Id. at 111.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
SEC v. Hickey, 322 F.3d 1123, 1128–30 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that no matter
how much control the defendant had over the brokerage, under Riddle, the first requirement of an alter ego relationship did not exist because the defendant did not
158
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In contrast to the courts that seem to require an equity ownership interest as a prerequisite to piercing, a number—perhaps a
growing number—of courts will pierce through the entity’s veil to an
166
“equitable owner.” Fontana v. TLD Builders, Inc., a 2005 Illinois
Court of Appeals decision, exemplifies piercing to reach an “equita167
ble owner.”
Theresa DiCosola was the sole shareholder of TLD,
but her husband Nicola was the “governing and dominating personal168
ity” of the corporation.
This control gave rise to the conclusion
that Nicola was TLD’s equitable owner, which, in turn, was sufficient
hold an ownership interest in the brokerage); Firstmark Capital Corp. v. Hempel Fin.
Corp., 859 F.2d 92, 94–95 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that Riddle requires an ownership
interest be established before a corporation’s obligations may be imposed on the individual). But see Logix Dev. Corp. v. Faherty, No. B178872, 2007 WL 1113255, at *6–
11 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2007), where the court held that Riddle relied primarily on
the amount of control an individual had and that ownership was simply a factor.
164
In Minno v. Pro-Fab, Inc., 905 N.E.2d 613 (Ohio 2009), for instance, the plaintiff tried to pierce the corporate veil to hold one corporation liable for another corporation’s debts. Id. at 615. The two corporations, Pro-Fab and See-Ann, were
owned by common shareholders, but neither corporation owned an interest in the
other corporation. Id. The plaintiff alleged that he was injured at work because of
See-Ann’s actions and that Pro-Fab controlled the work site and was the alter ego of
See-Ann. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this argument because Pro-Fab did
not hold an ownership interest in See-Ann, and therefore, it was unable to control
the sister corporation. Id. at 617. Thus, the lower court erred in holding a genuine
issue of material fact remained over whether the plaintiff could pierce the veil of SeeAnn and hold Pro-Fab liable. Id. at 615.
165
Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., 577 So. 2d 1060 (La. Ct. App. 1991), rev’d on other
grounds, 590 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1991). In Riggins, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants negligently leveled their house and sought to hold both the corporation’s
owner and an officer personally liable. Id. at 1061. The court reversed the trial
court’s decision to hold the officer liable because he did not hold an ownership interest in the corporation. Id. at 1065. The court reasoned that the purpose behind
piercing “is to protect a creditor in his dealings with a shareholder who fails to distinguish, in transactions, between the corporation and his identity as a shareholder.”
Id. On that basis, a piercing claim is “not applicable to employees and / or officers
who are not also shareholders in the corporation.” Id. But see Withers v. Timber
Prods., 574 So. 2d 1291 (La. Ct. App. 1991). Timber Products was pierced and codefendant Mr. Maker was held personally liable for its debts. Id. at 1295. At the time
of Timber Products’ incorporation, Maker was the sole shareholder and officer;
however, he subsequently transferred 100% of his stock to Mr. Johnson, who was a
judgment-proof convicted felon that had no knowledge or active role in Timber
Products after the swap. Id. Looking at the “totality of the circumstances,” the court
found that the trial court had not clearly erred in finding Maker the alter ego of
Timber Products despite his apparent lack of ownership. Id. But it is important to
note that the record contained no evidence of the transfer, so precedential value of
the case is weak.
166
See, e.g., Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Constr. & Paving, Inc., 447 A.2d 406,
412 (Conn. 1982).
167
840 N.E.2d 767, 771 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
168
Id. at 775.
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to “satisfy the ‘unity of interest and ownership’ element of piercing
169
the corporate veil.” The court reasoned that:
[S]tock ownership, while important, is not a prerequisite to piercing the corporate veil but is merely one factor to be considered in
evaluating the entire situation. . . . [T]he key factor in any decision to disregard the separate corporate entity is the element of
control or influence exercised by the individual sought to be held
170
liable over corporate affairs.

Colorado has embraced this line of reasoning, first in a 1984
171
corporate case, LaFond v. Basham, more recently in a case involving
172
an LLC, Sheffield Services Co. v. Trowbridge, and in another involving a
173
corporation, McCallum Family L.L.C. v. Winger.
A close analysis of
these Colorado cases demonstrates both the weakness of the “equitable ownership” doctrine and the likelihood that an alternative basis
for finding liability was present in the cases.
LaFond appears to be the first Colorado case holding a non174
shareholder liable for a corporate debt on a piercing theory. It in-

169
Id. at 777 (citing Freeman v. Complex Computing Co., 119 F.3d 1044, 1051
(2d Cir. 1997); In re MacDonald, 114 B.R. 326, 332–33 (D. Mass. 1990); Angelo Tomasso, Inc., 447 A.2d at 412; Establissement Tomis v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 459 F.
Supp. 1355, 1366 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Lally v. Catskill Airways, Inc., 603 N.Y.S.2d
619, 621 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)).
170
Angelo Tomasso, Inc., 447 A.2d at 412. New York is another jurisdiction that has
embraced the notion of equitable ownership. In Freeman, the plaintiff sought to hold
defendant Mr. Glazier liable for the obligations of Complex Computing Company
(“C3”) despite Glazier not being a C3 employee, officer, director, or shareholder.
Freeman, 119 F.3d at 1046. C3 was incorporated after Columbia University refused to
license the computer software that Glazier co-developed to a corporation in which
Glazier had an ownership interest. Id. To get around this, Glazier arranged for a
friend to be C3’s sole shareholder and initial director, while Glazier was hired by C3
as an independent contractor. Id. The district court found that, for all intents and
purposes, Glazier dominated and controlled C3 and held the only valuable interest
in C3. Id. at 1048. The appellate court rejected Glazier’s argument that because he
was “not a shareholder, officer, director, or employee of C3,” the plaintiff could not
pierce the corporate veil and hold Glazier liable. Id. at 1051. The court reasoned
that New York courts recognize the doctrine of equitable owner, and “to regard
[Glazier] as anything but the sole stockholder and controlling person of C3 would be
to exalt form over substance.” Id. at 1052 (internal quotes omitted). But, while the
C3’s veil could be pierced and Glazier held liable, the court remanded the case to
determine whether Glazier used his control “to commit a fraud or other wrong that
resulted in unjust loss or injury to Freeman.” Id. at 1053.
171
683 P.2d 367, 369–70 (Colo. App. 1984).
172
211 P.3d 714 (Colo. App. 2009).
173
221 P.3d 69 (Colo. App. 2009).
174
The court in LaFond cited only Rosebud Corp. v. Boggio, 561 P.2d 367 (Colo.
App. 1977) as precedent for its holding, see LaFond, 683 P.2d at 369, but the defendant in Rosebud was a shareholder, see Rosebud, 561 P.2d at 369.

LOEWENSTEIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6/16/2011 1:28 PM

868

[Vol. 41:839

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

volved a garden-variety problem; homeowners were aggrieved when
their home remodelers (two Colorado corporations) breached their
175
agreement. Finding the corporation without assets, the homeowners sued the individual who “ran” the corporations, Basham, although
176
he was not a shareholder (instead, his wife and son were). LaFond
announced a new and rather broad rule of law:
A corporate entity may be disregarded and corporate directors
may be held personally liable if equity so requires. . . . If adherence to the corporate fiction would promote injustice, protect
fraud, defeat a legitimate claim, or defend crime, the invocation of
equitable principles for the imposition of personal liability may
177
occur.

Read literally, if a creditor’s claim is unpaid, equity requires that di178
rectors be held personally liable. Such a rule, however, would practically eliminate the concept of limited liability. Moreover, until the
recent cases of Sheffield and McCallum, LaFond has had no influence
on the development of the law.
LaFond could have been litigated on the narrower grounds dis179
cussed above—fraudulent transfer and unauthorized distribution.
The court noted in the opinion that “[w]hen the corporations arrived at virtual insolvency status, [Basham] demanded, to the detriment of other creditors, payment upon his notes, which allegedly
were due him at the time, and he took over corporate assets to the
180
detriment of other creditors, including the LaFonds.” These findings suggest a strong case against Basham on statutory grounds and
under the corporate trust doctrine. Yet the judgment was solely on
veil-piercing grounds, and Basham was liable for the breach of contract damages suffered by the plaintiffs, with no indication of the
181
amount of improper distributions to him.
The court in McCallum employed the reasoning in LaFond to
182
hold corporate manager, Marc Winger, liable.
The plaintiff had
175

LaFond, 683 P.2d at 368.
Id.
177
Id. at 369 (emphasis added).
178
The federal district court, in one of the few cases to cite to LaFond, recognized
this problem: “The court agrees that any equitable doctrine must be narrowly applied, else the time-honored presumption against imposing personal liability on officers and directors be eroded.” Marriner v. Nation-Wide Horse Transp., Inc., No.
Civ.03-808-MO, 2004 WL 2203297, at *4 (D. Or. Sept. 29, 2004).
179
See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
180
LaFond, 683 P.2d at 369.
181
See id. at 369.
182
McCallum Family LLC v. Winger, 221 P.3d 69, 69 (Colo. App. 2009).
176
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leased property to the corporation, Manitoba, and, although all lease
payments were made, the corporation failed to pay property taxes as
183
required under the lease. The lessor paid the taxes and obtained a
184
judgment against the corporation for the payment.
When the
judgment against the corporation went unsatisfied, the plaintiff
185
sought to recover from Winger on a piercing theory.
Winger managed the corporation, but he was not an officer, director, or share186
holder. His wife and mother-in-law, however, each owned fifty percent of the outstanding stock and were the corporation’s sole officers
187
and directors. Winger ran the corporation with apparently no oversight from his wife or mother-in-law, had used corporate funds to pay
188
personal expenses, and otherwise “abused” the corporate form.
While the trial court concluded that veil piercing was inappropriate, the court of appeals, after marching dutifully through the
189
three-prong test applied in Colorado, concluded that plaintiff had
established a prima facie case for veil piercing and remanded the case
190
to the trial court for further proceedings. The appellate court concluded that Winger was an equitable owner of the corporation and its
alter ego and that because he diverted corporate funds for his own
purposes, failing to pierce the corporate veil would defeat plaintiff’s
191
“rightful claim.”
These facts were sufficient to satisfy the first two
veil-piercing tests, and the case was remanded to allow the trial court
183

Id. at 72.
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
McCallum, 221 P.3d at 72.
189
Id. at 74.
To determine whether it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil, a
court must make a three-part inquiry. First, the court must determine
whether the corporate entity is the “alter ego” of the person or entity in
issue. . . . Second, the court must determine whether justice requires
recognizing the substance of the relationship between the person or
entity sought to be held liable and the corporation over the form because the corporate fiction was “used to perpetrate a fraud or defeat a
rightful claim.” . . . Third, the court must consider whether an equitable result will be achieved by disregarding the corporate form and
holding a shareholder or other insider personally liable for the acts of
the business entity. . . . All three prongs of the analysis must be satisfied. The paramount goal of piercing the corporate veil is to achieve an
equitable result.
Id. (citations omitted).
190
Id. at 74, 80.
191
Id. at 79.
184
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to exercise its equitable discretion to determine whether to pierce the
192
corporate veil.
This conclusion of the appellate court was rather remarkable in
light of the findings of the lower court, which the appellate court
summarized:
Here, the trial court noted that Marc Winger did not sign
the lease; no evidence was presented that he conspired with his
father or anyone else to mismanage Manitoba or divert its assets
to avoid its liability under the lease; there was no evidence that
McCallum [the creditor] had investigated Manitoba’s financial
circumstances before renting to it; and ‘Manitoba apparently
lived up to its obligations under the lease (except for paying . . .
193
property taxes) for four or five years.’

It seems that Winger withdrew money from the corporation for personal purposes, but these withdrawals could be characterized as compensation. The informality with which the business was run should
not be the basis for holding its manager personally liable, but that
was essentially what the appellate court was suggesting. Because the
corporation was insolvent, the creditor had the option of filing a
claim against the corporation’s directors for breach of their fiduciary
194
duty to the corporation. Any recovery would go to the corporation
195
to be available to all of the corporation’s creditors. If a defendant
unlawfully diverted corporate resources to himself, that claim may be
pursued by the creditors in the same action under the rubric of frau196
dulent transfers or breach of fiduciary duty. But these actions limit
the exposure of entity managers to the amounts wrongfully paid, not
197
to all liabilities of the entity. These causes of action are more closely designed to address the loss suffered and better suited to the facts
of McCallum.
LaFond was also the basis for extending veil-piercing liability to
198
managers of an LLC in Sheffield and, as in LaFond and McCallum, the
extension of liability appears to be unwarranted. Sheffield involved an
LLC that had a “subdivision agreement” with the City of Broomfield
under which it was obligated to improve lots it owned as a condition
192

Id.
Id. at 78.
194
See McCallum, 221 P.3d at 80 (noting that plaintiffs could file such a claim under prior precedent but holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the
claim).
195
See supra notes 152–56 and accompanying text.
196
See McCallum, 221 P.3d at 80.
197
See In re Amdura Corp, 75 F.3d 1447, 1452 (10th Cir. 1996).
198
See Sheffield Servs. Co. v. Trowbridge, 211 P.3d 714, 718 (Colo. App. 2009).
193

LOEWENSTEIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

6/16/2011 1:28 PM

VEIL PIERCING TO NON-OWNERS

871

199

to obtaining a building permit.
Prior to completing these improvements, the LLC agreed to sell the subject lots to the plaintiff
and represented in the sales agreement that the improvements had
200
been made.
After the closing, the plaintiff sued for breach and
sought to hold the LLC manager personally liable for the damages
201
arising from the breach of contract. The trial court held in favor of
the defendant-manager, reasoning that only LLC members can be
202
held liable on a piercing theory.
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed this holding in a
203
Colorado, like many other jurisdictions, has a
strange opinion.
provision in its LLC statute that permits veil-piercing claims against
204
“members.” The Colorado court ruled, however, that this statutory
claim did not preclude a common-law claim for veil piercing and,
under the common law of Colorado (citing only LaFond), a manager
of an LLC may be held liable for the obligations of the company if
205
the veil-piercing criteria are present. As the lower court dismissed
the veil-piercing claim, the case was remanded for a determination of
206
whether these criteria were in fact present.
The appellate court,
however, clearly suggested that veil piercing was appropriate, noting
how the defendant acted to “frustrate the . . . creditors” and enrich
207
himself.
Sheffield is a good example of why veil piercing is a troubling doctrine. The plaintiff’s claim was one for damages for breach of representation, and the plaintiff, by his own admission, was a sophisticated
real estate developer who should have known of the misrepresenta208
tion.
Indeed, plaintiff had sued the defendant on an individual
claim for negligent misrepresentation but failed because the court
concluded that plaintiff’s reliance on the misrepresentation was not
reasonable; he should have made inquiry of the city before closing on
199

Id. at 717.
Id.
201
Id. at 718.
202
Id. at 718–19.
203
See id. at 721.
204
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-107(1) (2010) (“In any case in which a party seeks to
hold the members of a[n LLC] personally responsible for the alleged improper actions of the [LLC], the court shall apply the case law which interprets the conditions
and circumstances under which the corporate veil of a corporation may be pierced
under Colorado law.”).
205
Sheffield, 211 P.3d at 721–22.
206
Id. at 722.
207
Id. at 719.
208
See id. at 718.
200
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209

the transaction.
Thus, plaintiff’s claim is against an individual
manager for breach of representation by an entity when the facts indicate that the plaintiff unreasonably relied on that representation (if
he relied on it at all). Put differently, the court remakes the contract
by suggesting that the defendant might be personally liable on the
LLC’s misrepresentation, thereby giving the plaintiff far more than
he bargained for.
To the extent that the defendant made improper distributions
from the LLC, there are, as in other veil-piercing cases, ample doctrines to address the conduct. There are strong suggestions in the
opinion that the defendant’s actions constituted fraudulent transfers
210
and, if so, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provides a remedy.
Moreover, as in LaFond, the statutory provision for unlawful distributions and the corporate trust fund doctrine provided plaintiff with
211
Indeed, the Sheffield court held that the corporate trust
remedies.
fund doctrine may be applied to impose personal liability on the
manager of an LLC who favors his own claims when distributing LLC
assets, if the company was insolvent or rendered insolvent when the
212
distribution was made.
These doctrines came together in another recent Colorado case,
Colborne Corp. v. Weinstein, where a creditor brought a claim against
213
the members and managers of a Colorado LLC. The claim against
the members alleged that they received a distribution from the LLC
that rendered the company insolvent and the distribution, therefore,
was recoverable by the creditor under a provision of Colorado’s LLC
214
act. Against the managers, the creditor claimed that those distributions favored managers and were, therefore, in violation of the trust
215
doctrine. The appellate court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on both
216
claims. As to the first claim, the court noted that the Colorado LLC
act provides that the unlawful distribution is recoverable by the
217
LLC. Nevertheless, the court held that the creditor had standing to
maintain this claim, consistent with precedents that allowed corporate creditors to maintain claims against corporate shareholders un209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217

Id. at 725.
See id. at 721–22.
See Sheffield, 211 P.3d at 721–22.
Id. at 723.
No. 09CA0724, 2010 WL 185416, at *1 (Colo. App. Jan. 21, 2010).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2–4.
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der a similar statute because the managers of the LLC had no incen218
tive to maintain a claim against themselves.
On the corporate trust doctrine claim, the appellate court relied
219
on Sheffield.
Interestingly, no piercing claim was brought against
the members or managers in Colborne, although the facts suggest that
220
Whether there were other facts that
one might have succeeded.
undermined such a claim, or the lawyers overlooked the claim, it is
221
noteworthy that the creditor got full relief without it.
In short, then, statutory provisions and a common-law doctrine
all protect entity creditors from the risk that those who control the
entity will favor their own claims against the entity or otherwise
enrich the entity’s owners to the detriment of creditors. Veil piercing
is an overlay on these doctrines that potentially expands this liability
and does so in an unpredictable and haphazard manner.
IV. CONCLUSION
LaFond, Sheffield, and McCallum each demonstrate the ad hoc
quality of veil piercing and the lack of an underlying rationale to justify the doctrine. The doctrine of veil piercing is grounded on a notion that the state has granted the owners of a business the privilege
of operating the business with the assurance of limited liability in exchange for which those owners must operate that business as a separate entity. If owners fail to adhere to that bargain, thereby “abusing”
the privilege, they risk the loss of that limited liability. When nonowners are held liable for the entity’s debts, it cannot be said that
they abused any privilege, as they were never granted one. Moreover,
these cases sharply demonstrate the absence of causation in veil
piercing. Plaintiff’s loss in Sheffield was, at best, caused by a misrepresentation, and in LaFond and McCallum the plaintiffs’ losses were the
222
result of illegal distributions.
In no case was the plaintiff’s loss
caused by defendant’s failure to recognize the separate existence of
the entity.
The effect of extending liability to non-owners is to increase the
risk of personal liability to employees and other actors in an entity
and to continue the erosion of the limited liability concept. All this
comes at a cost: employees will require a risk premium and promo-

218
219
220
221
222

Id. at *4.
Colborne Corp, 2010 WL 185416, at *5.
See id.
See id. at *5–6.
See discussion of cases supra Part III.B.
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ters of limited liability entities face greater uncertainty. More importantly, carefully crafted legislative solutions are mooted and replaced
by fuzzy judicially created doctrines. The tendency of courts—and, in
223
a few cases, legislatures —to extend the veil-piercing doctrine to
LLCs only compounds these problems. The questions of whether
and when owners and managers of limited liability entities should be
liable for the entity’s debts is one that calls for a legislative, not judicial, resolution. Arguably, state legislatures have addressed this question in multiple ways. Nevertheless, the tendency of state courts to
modify business entity statutes continues and, in the area of veil piercing, profoundly so.

223

See CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101(b) (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-107
(2010).

